Methodologies to develop quantitative risk evaluation metrics by Hamid, Thaier K.A. et al.
International Journal of Computer Applications (0975 – 888) 
Volume 48– No.14, June 2012 
17 
Methodologies to Develop Quantitative Risk Evaluation 
Metrics
Thaier Hamid, PhD. 
University of Bedfordshire, UK
Carsten Maple 
University of Bedfordshire, UK
Paul Sant, PhD. 
University of Bedfordshire, UK 
 
ABSTRACT 
The goal of this work is to advance a new methodology to 
measure a severity cost for each host using the Common 
Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) based on base, 
temporal and environmental metrics by combining related 
sub-scores to produce a unique severity cost by modeling  the 
problem‟s parameters in to a mathematical framework. We 
build our own CVSS Calculator using our equations to 
simplify the calculations of the vulnerabilities scores and to 
benchmark with other models. We design and develop a new 
approach to represent the cost assigned to each host by 
dividing the scores of the vulnerabilities to two main levels of 
privileges, user and root, and we classify these levels into 
operational levels to identify and calculate the severity cost of 
multi steps vulnerabilities. Finally we implement our 
framework on a simple network, using Nessus scanner as tool 
to discover known vulnerabilities and to implement the results 
to build and represent our cost centric attack graph. 
General Terms 
Vulnerabilities, security. CVSS. Quantitative security metrics. 
Keywords  
Quantifying security, CVSSv2, Overall CVSS score, Attack 
graph. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Oxford dictionary defines a metric as “a system or 
standard of measurement”. From this meaning the 
measurement is used to clarify the term metric.  Quantitative 
security metrics could present a clear picture on security 
structure and support security decisions and also assist experts 
to understand the capability of a system to carry on a task 
under attack. Risk assessment could be implemented to 
measure system reliability and to benchmark different security 
solutions. A measureable risk assessment is the main tool we 
used to determine if the additional budget should be allocated 
to afford more secure features. The objective of risk 
assessment is to measure the likelihood of exploitability and 
its consequences (impact). We can achieve our objective by 
assessing the probability that manifests threats in terms of 
access required and attack complexity and by weighting the 
impact of the occurrence with the damage potential, they may 
effect.  
1-Compliance metrics: measures compliance with current 
security and privacy regulations and standards, such as 
HIPAA, Sarbanes-Oxley, GLBA, etc.  
2-Resilience metrics: measures the resilience of controls 
relating to physical security, personnel security, IT security, 
and operational security both before and after a product, 
system or network is deployed. 
3- Return on investment (ROI) metrics: measures the ROI in 
physical, personnel, IT, and operational security controls to 
guide capital investment. 
There are a number of other security metrics systems 
accomplished by both commercial and noncommercial 
organizations. They each have their merits, but they differ in 
what they measure. For example, CERT/CC produces a 
numeric score ranging from 0 to 180 but considers such 
factors as whether the Internet infrastructure is at risk and 
what sort of preconditions are required to exploit the 
vulnerability [United States Computer Emergency Readiness 
Team (US-CERT). US-CERT Vulnerability Note Field 
Descriptions. The SANS vulnerability analysis scale considers 
whether the weakness is found in default configurations or 
client or server systems (SANS Institute. SANS Critical 
Vulnerability Analysis Archive). Microsoft‟s proprietary 
scoring system [2] tries to reflect the difficulty of exploitation 
and the overall impact of the vulnerability (Microsoft 
Corporation. Microsoft Security Response Center Security 
Bulletin Severity Rating System).  The Common 
Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) gives an open structure 
for communicating the individualities and impacts of IT 
vulnerabilities.  
The CVSS model is aimed at providing the end user with a 
complete merged score representing the severity and risk of a 
vulnerability. It is resultant from metrics and formulas. The 
metrics are in three different groupings that can be 
quantitatively or qualitatively measured. Base Metrics contain 
qualities that are essential to any given vulnerability that do 
not change over time or in different environments. Temporal 
Metrics contain individualities of a vulnerability which 
change over the lifetime of a vulnerability. Environmental 
Metrics comprises those characteristics of a vulnerability 
which are tense to an implementation in a specific user‟s 
environment. The National Vulnerability Database (NVD) 
and The Common Vulnerabilities and Exploits Database 
(CVE) provide specific CVSS scores for publicly known 
vulnerabilities.    
1.1 Common Vulnerability scoring System 
(CVSS)   
The Common Vulnerability Scoring System is industry open 
standards designed to deliver vulnerability severity and help 
determine resolution and priority of response. It solves the 
problem of multiple, incompatible scoring systems and its 
functioning and comprehensible system [3]. The metrics and 
equations in CVSS were designed to be sensibly complete, 
accurate, and easy to use. They reflect the cumulative 
experience of the CVSSSIG as well as extensive testing of 
real-world vulnerabilities in end-user environments. As 
demonstrated in Figure 1, the CVSS is composed of three 
metric groups: Base, Temporal, and Environmental, each 
consisting of a set of metrics aimed at providing the end user 
with an overall combination score representing the severity 
and risk of a vulnerability. 
International Journal of Computer Applications (0975 – 888) 
Volume 48– No.14, June 2012 
18 
 
 
Figure-1: The CVSS Model 
 1.2 Vulnerability Databases 
Vulnerabilities classification is a joint effort of the Common 
Vulnerabilities and Exploits Database (CVE) and the MITRE 
Corporation, a non-profit organization managing national 
defense and research facilities, foundations, and projects. The 
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) list [1] an 
initiative to standardize vulnerability references and gives 
vulnerabilities a name in the form CVE-YYYY-XXXX, 
where YYYY is the year in which the vulnerability was first 
reported. This central database allows each of the 
vulnerabilities to have one unique identifier, a CVE id, such 
as “CVE- 2002-0649.” The use of unique identifiers reduces 
the complexity of the international security threat 
identification effort, in that there are fewer duplicate 
vulnerabilities circulating, enabling a cleaner, simpler network 
report to be generated. CVE serves as more of a dictionary of 
vulnerabilities than a database. The National Vulnerability 
Database (NVD) is one of NIST‟s important security assets 
for determining the severity of computer security risks. NVD 
is the sum of many other security databases, and utilizes the 
CVSS scoring system, allowing the fullest utilization of 
available public computer security risk analysis, and 
quantification methods via CVSS scores [4]. NVD is also 
linked with CVE, enabling comparison and expansion of 
NVD with CVE entries.   The CVSS scores from NVD, and 
identified vulnerability signatures in NVD entries allow for 
this automated approach. NVD is used as the primary resource 
for finding vulnerabilities and determining their comparative 
severity and impact. Using NVD‟s information about the 
vulnerabilities, vulnerability signatures can be derived, 
enabling matching of network conditions to the extracted 
signatures, then matching to CVE IDs, and getting the CVSS 
base score from the NVD entries, scores can be acquired for 
each of the vulnerabilities which have been identified from 
the matching process. NVD provides a reputable, widely used, 
constantly updated, and openly available resource. 
2.  QUANTITATIVE RISK 
EVALUATION 
The risk is defined to be a function of the probability 
(likelihood) and the severity (impact) of the probable breaches 
on the systems. The risk in IT systems could be exposed to 
Internet, Network [1], Servers and local host.  Our prototype 
uses base, temporal, and environmental metric groups set in 
the CVSS to evaluate the risk rate. The initial exploitability 
metrics driven form CVSS base score (i.e. the base metrics 
associated to exploitability) captures access required (AV) 
and attack complexity (AC) and authentication instances (Au). 
The corresponding values could be seen in Table -1. The 
initial exploitability is calculated as follows:  

n
baseV AuACAVPE
1
int ),,(
 
We use CVSS version 2 released on June 20th, 2007 to 
produce unique quantities metric to measure the severity cost 
of a specific vulnerability. We base our methodology on the 
following facts driven from a careful consideration of 
different sub metrics. 
1- If the attacker manages to exploit a specific vulnerability 
without causing any damage (impact) in terms of 
confidentiality, integrity and availability, then it is not logical 
to consider the risk weight as zero - considering the risk 
represented by impact times likelihood of exploitability - as 
the explosions in multi-step intrusions might lead to access 
another vulnerability inside or outside the system. The risk 
matrixes weighting will solve this problem in case there are 
no impact score of explosions. Distributed of likelihood of 
exploitability as follows: 
25% assigned for access required (AV). 
40 % assigned for attack complexity (AC). 
35%   assigned for authentication instances (Au). 
2- As the impact measures the damage caused by 
vulnerability, we believe that the impact represents 70% of the 
total risk severity. Within the impact metric we distribute the 
weight on the different sub metrics as follows: 
20% assigned for confidentiality value, which represent 
different impacts on informational exposé  
35% assigned for integrity value as the attacker might modify 
or delete the data as impact. 
45% assigned for availability value as the impact might 
indicate crash or total shutdown or reduction in the 
performance of the system.  Using the Common Vulnerability 
Scoring System (CVSS) version 2 based on base, temporal, 
and environmental metrics by combining related sub-scores to 
produce a unique severity cost by modelling the problem‟s 
parameters in to a mathematical framework, ( for example in 
the temporal metrics, if the exploitability tools & techniques 
(E) sub metric touch the high score - the tools and techniques 
available on the Internet as information‟s or freeware) this 
will increase the score of Access Vector (AV). 
BaseAVE temporal   
In the same logic we reached the following relations: 
BaseActemporalRL  
BaseActemporalRC  
Once the Base and Temporal metrics are evaluated, the 
assessments are aggregated into one value of probability score    
calculated as shown below:  
0.384422*))*35.0()***4.0(),**25.0((
temporaltemporaltemporal
AuRCRLAcEAVEv 
 The same justification applies to impact: The possible 
adjusted impact intrinsic to a vulnerability (i.e. the base 
metrics related to impact) can be increased or decreased 
depending on the security requirements driven from 
environmental metrics as shown below:
Base(C)  (CR)  talenvironmen   
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  Base
 (I) (IR) talenvironmen   
Base (A) (AR) talenvironmen   
Base (A) (CDP) talenvironmen   
BaseBaseBase (C), (I) , (A) (TD) talenvironmen   
Target Distribution (TD) metric measures the percentage of 
systems that could be affected by the vulnerability. The 
parameters of this environmental sub metrics could be None 
(N), low (L), medium (M), high (H). The None (N): for 
example means that no target systems exists - in other words 
the impact scores  on Confidentiality, Integrity and 
availability will be null. The same logic applies to low (L), 
medium (M), high (H). This sub metric has direct effect on A, 
I, C. 
0.906*))****45.0(),***35.0(),***2.0(( envenvenvenv envenvenvi CDPTDARATDIRITDCRCI basebasebasev 
  
According to ISO 31010, the risk is derived by combining the 
consequences of a threat (impact) with the likelihood of its 
exploitability as follows: 
Risk = Likelihood of an adverse event *Impact of the 
adverse event. 
Since 1980 the above method has been fundamentally 
challenged. Specialists accept the main elements in the 
function but disagree on the production of likelihood and 
impact on calculating the risk, as the risk should be evaluated 
in terms of maximum impact on an adverse event. By 
establishing our model on the temporal and environmental 
information given in the CVSS metrics, we use easily 
accessible and publicly open context information that are 
regularly updated and maintained [1]. 
 
),( LIfWi   
To adjust the total Cost value using the risk matrix illustrated 
the following equation is used: 
2/))100*)4.7619**(( vVvv WIECost   
A risk matrix linking the two vectors likelihood and impact is 
a graphical description of different risks in a relative way. The 
matrix uses four levels of weights to classify the ranks of 
different types of risks. 
 
Figure-2: A risk matrix 
1- Level 1: (100): A vulnerability that will allow an intruder 
to immediately gain privileged access (e.g. Administrator, 
root) to the system. For example Buffer overflow from local 
or remote system  
2-Level 2 (70): Vulnerabilities that allow local or remote 
users to increase their privileges on a system or access 
confidential information such as company financial records or 
user passwords are usually considered moderate risks  
3-Level 3 (50):  vulnerability like a Denial-of-Service attack.” 
Generally, do not compromise the system beyond a Denial-of-
Service. This type of condition is often inherent in running a 
particular service.  
4-Level 4 (10): A vulnerability that provides information to an 
intruder that could lead to further compromise attempts 
Information about the target is gathered. 
  We build our own CVSS Calculator using our equations to 
simplify the calculations of the vulnerabilities scores and to 
benchmarking with other models as shown in Figure-3as you 
can see The CVSS scores range from [0, 100] with the higher 
the worse security.  
 
Figure-3: Our CVSS Calculator 
Definition 1 (Maximum cost) if we have vulnerability (V) 
with access required network (N) and attack complexity  
low(L), authentication instances none( N) this will lead to  
Maximum exploitability  and if we have confidentiality 
impact complete (C) and integrity impact complete 
(C),availability impact complete (C) as Maximum impact this 
will give the Maximum cost. Because this vulnerability is 
with very high risk, the Weight=100 according to risk 
matrices..The given vulnerability has the following 
parameters 
(AV:[ N]/AC:[ L]/Au:[N]/C:[ C]/I:[C ]/A:[C])   
(E:[ H ]/RL:[ U ]/RC:[ C ]) Temporal  
(TD:[ND]/CDP:[ H ]/CR:[H]/IR:[H]/AR:[ H ]) Environmental 
 
0.384422*))*35.0()***4.0(),**25.0((
temporaltemporaltemporal
AuRCRLAcEAVEv   
384422.0*))704.0*35.0()1*1*71.0*4.0()1*1*25.0(( vE  
 300.0vE  
0.90631*))****45.0(),***35.0(),***2.0(( envenvenvenv envenvenvi CDPTDARATDIRITDCRCI basebasebasev 
 
90631.0*))5.0*1*51.1*66.0*45.0()1*51.1*66.0*45.0)1*51.1*66.0*35.0()1*51.1*66.0*2.0(( vI
 
700.0vI  
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2/))100*)4.7619**(( vVvv WIECost   
2/)100)100*)4.7619*700.0*0.300(( vCost
 
001vCost  
CVSS metrics group CVSS attribute Rating Rating 
value 
 
 
 
base metrics 
Exploitability 
access required (AV) local (L) 0.395 
adjacent network (A) 0.646 
network (N) 1.0 
attack complexity (AC) high (H) 0.35 
medium (M) 0.61 
low (L) 0.71 
authentication instances (Au) multiple (M) 0.45 
single (S) 0.56 
none (N) 0.704 
Table.1: CVSS base metrics-(exploitability) 
Definition 2 (Minimum cost) if we have vulnerability (V) 
with access required network (L) and attack complexity  
low(H), authentication instances none( M) this will lead to  
Minimum exploitability  and if we have confidentiality impact 
none (N) and integrity impact none (N), availability impact  
none (N) as Minimum impact this will give the Minimum 
cost. Because this vulnerability is with low risk (level (4) in 
risk matrix), the Weight=10 referring to risk matrices.  
(AV:[ L]/AC:[H]/Au:[M]/C:[ N]/I:[N ]/A:[N])  
 (E:[ U ]/RL:[ OF ]/RC:[ UC ]) Temporal  
(TD:[N]/CDP:[ N ]/CR:[L]/IR:[L]/AR:[ L ]) Environmental 
0.384422*))*35.0()***4.0(),**25.0((
temporaltemporaltemporal
AuRCRLAcEAVEv   
 0.1162vE   
 
0.90631*))****45.0(),***35.0(),***2.0(( envenvenvenv envenvenvi CDPTDARATDIRITDCRCI basebasebasev 
000.0vI   
2/))100*)4.7619**(( vVvv WIECost   
5vCost  
 
 
 
 
 
CVSS metrics 
group 
CVSS attribute Rating Rating 
value 
 
 
 
base metrics 
impact 
confidentiality impact (C) none (N) 0.0 
partial (P) 0.275 
complete (C) 0.660 
integrity impact (I) none (N) 0.0 
partial (P) 0.275 
complete (C) 0.660 
availability impact (A) none (N) 0.0 
partial (P) 0.275 
complete (C) 0.660 
Table.2: CVSS base metrics- (impact) 
CVSS metrics 
group 
CVSS attribute Rating Rating 
value 
 
 
 
temporal metrics 
exploitability tools & 
techniques (E) 
unproved (U) 0.395 
proof-of-concept(P) 0.646 
functional (F) 0.95 
high (H) 1.0 
remediation level (RL) official fix (OF) 0.87 
temporary fix (TF) 0.90 
workaround (W) 0.95 
unavailable (U) 1.0 
report confidence (RC) unconfirmed (UC) 0.90 
Un corroborative (UR) 0.95 
confirmed (C) 1.0 
Table.3: CVSS base metrics- (temporal metrics) 
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CVSS metrics group CVSS attribute Rating Rating 
value 
 
 
 
environmental 
metrics 
confidentiality 
requirement (CR) 
low (L) 0.5 
medium (M) 1.0 
high (H) 1.51 
integrity requirement (IR) low (L) 0.5 
medium (M) 1.0 
high (H) 1.51 
availability requirement (AR) low (L) 0.5 
medium (M) 1.0 
high (H) 1.51 
collateral damage 
potential (CDP) 
none (N) 0.0 
low (L) 0.1 
low medium (LM) 0.3 
medium high (MH) 0.4 
high (H) 0.5 
 
 
Target Distribution (TD) 
Non(N) 0.0 
low (L) 0.25 
medium (M) 0.75 
high (H) 1.0 
Not Defined(ND) 1.0 
Table.4: CVSS base metrics- (environmental metrics) 
2.1 PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION 
We will use our CVSS equations to calculate the severity cost 
of the vulnerability CVE-2002-1142, Microsoft Data Access 
Components RDS Data Stub Remote Overflow. 
Synopsis: The remote host is affected by remote buffer 
overflow vulnerability. 
Description: The remote DLL /msadc/msadcs.dll is 
accessible by anyone. Several flaws have been found in it in 
the past. We recommend that you restrict access to MSADC 
only to trusted hosts. 
Solution:- Launch the Internet Services Manager 
- Select your web server - Right-click on MSADC and select 
'Properties' 
- Select the tab 'Directory Security' 
- Click on the 'IP address and domain name restrictions' 
option 
- Make sure that by default, all computers are DENIED access 
to this resource 
- List the computers that should be allowed to use it 
CVSS Score 
7.5 (CVSS2#AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P) Base 
 (E:[ H ]/RL:[TF ]/RC:[  C ]) Temporal 
(CDP:[ H ]/TD[H]/CR:[H]/IR:[H ]/AR:[ H ]) Environmental 
0.384422*))*35.0()***4.0(),**25.0((
temporaltemporaltemporal
AuRCRLAcEAVEv 
0.2891vE  
0.90631*))****45.0(),***35.0(),***2.0(( envenvenvenv envenvenvi CDPTDARATDIRITDCRCI basebasebasev 
 
0.2917vI  
2/))100*)4.7619**(( vVvv WILCost   
2/)100)100*)4.7619*0.2917*0.2891(( vCost  
70.08vCost  
Now we will use the solution to list the computers that 
should be allowed to have access to Server-A, by 
configuring the firewall as shown in figure 4 
                                                                     
Figure-4: Practical Example 
If we locate Sever A behind the firewall, then the weight 
level of the risk driven from risk metrics will drop down 
from 100 to 10 and the Environmental metrics parameters 
change as follow  
(CDP:[ N ]/TD[N]/CR:[L]/IR:[L ]/AR:[ L ]) 
 When we try to access Server A from any computer not in 
the firewall‟s list 
0.384422*))*35.0()***4.0(),**25.0((
temporaltemporaltemporal
AuRCRLAcEAVEv   
0.2891vE  
0.90631*))****45.0(),***35.0(),***2.0(( envenvenvenv envenvenvi CDPTDARATDIRITDCRCI basebasebasev 
 
0.0000vI  
2/))100*)4.7619**(( vVvv WILCost   
2/)10)100*)4.7619*0.0*0.2891(( vCost  
5.0vCost  
2.2 Cost calculation framework: 
The Nessus scanner is designed to identify Vulnerabilities 
before the hackers can exploit them. In our project we will use 
the Nessus scanner as a tool to discover known 
Vulnerabilities. First, we will analyze the Vulnerability 
attributes and then we classify and calculate Vulnerabilities 
cost according to privileges as follows: 
1-The cost of vulnerabilities that will allow an intruder to 
immediately gain privileged access (root, system 
administrator (2)). 
2- The cost of vulnerabilities that will allow an intruder to    
gain access to the system with privileged user only (privileged 
user (1)). 
 
External 
Network 
Attacker 
Server A 
Firewall Server A 
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3- The cost of vulnerabilities that will allow an intruder to 
gain access to the system with guest or without having any 
account to access the system (Guest or None (0)).
 
Figure-5: Cost calculation framework 
The mode for joining the vulnerabilities into one score for the 
machine is derived at by first taking each of the 
vulnerabilities, and getting their CVSS scores. Then the 
vulnerabilities are listed on a table similar to the table 5 and  
6. These are classified according to the vulnerabilities 
specification to User privileges vulnerabilities (i.e.  The 
impact of the vulnerabilities does not include gain privileged 
access) and root privileges vulnerabilities which include gain 
privileged along with other impacts. After this, the 
vulnerabilities are processed using the following equations:
./)(
1
1,. 
n
nXn nvCostC
 
 Where Vn are User privileges vulnerabilities 

n
nXn nvCostC
1
2,. /)(
  
Where Vn are Root privileges vulnerabilities 
The average operational level is operational level 0 (OL0) or 
average of full set of vulnerabilities which represent the 
values assigned when the attacker directly reaches a specific 
state. The highest operational level is operational level 1 
(OL1) or average of set of vulnerabilities which represent the 
values assigned when the attacker can touch specific states 
indirectly through a multi-step intrusion. The selection of the 
vulnerabilities depends on the specifications for each 
vulnerability. After careful considerations of more than 3000 
vulnerabilities, we discovered that the state transit of a multi-
step intrusion happens mainly with vulnerabilities with 
severity cost greater than 45, besides other attributes of the 
vulnerability. The formula we will use to calculate operational 
level 1(OL1) is: 
 
n
nnLXn nVvCostC
1
,. /))45().((
 
3. PRACTICAL APPROACH TO DEVELOP 
COST-CENTRIC ATTACK GRAPH. 
 Instead of specifying a state by network attributes, we 
propose cost-centric model checking, in which each state is 
specified by the attributes of a single host. We refer to the 
corresponding attack graphs generated with model checking 
algorithms as cost-centric attack graphs. We use our 
methodologies and all the concepts mentioned in section 2 to 
develop quantitative risk evaluation metrics and we will use 
the results to build our cost-centric attack graphs. We use 
Nessus scanner as a tool to discover known Vulnerabilities on 
IP1 and IP2 on the simple network shown in figure-6, and we 
analyze the Nessus scanning reports adding our environmental 
metrics according to our setting. We calculate the severity 
cost for each vulnerability based on CVSS score then we 
process the results by classifying them to user and root 
privileges levels. We may need to live with some of the 
vulnerabilities, and take countermeasures only when a multi-
step intrusion is actually happening, so within each level we 
classify  the vulnerabilities to  operational level 0 and 1(a 
multi-steps intrusion), then we use the results to build the 
cost-centric attack graphs. 
 
Figure-6: Simple Network 
The list of Vulnerabilities we got after using Nessus scanning 
reports on (IP1) the total numbers of Vulnerabilities is 14 we 
will present some of the Vulnerabilities parameters as shown 
below: 
1-(CVSS2#AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P) Base 
 (E:[ H ]/RL:[ OF ]/RC:[ C ]) Temporal  
(CDP:[ MH ]/TD:[H]/CR:[L]/IR:[L ]/AR:[ H ]) 
Environmental 
39.6112213Cost  
2- (CVSS2#AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P) 
(E:[ F ]/RL:[ OF ]/RC:[ C ]) Temporal  
(CDP:[ H ]/TD:[H]/CR:[H]/IR:[H ]/AR:[ H ]) Environmental 
45.0845517Cost  
3- CVSS2#AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C) 
(E:[ P ]/RL:[ OF ]/RC:[ C ]) Temporal  
(CDP:[ ND ] /TD:[H]/CR:[H]/IR:[H]/AR:[H]) Environmental 
89.5310357Cost  
4-(CVSS2#AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P) 
(E:[ P ]/RL:[ OF ]/RC:[ C ]) Temporal  
(CDP:[ MH]/ TD:[H]/CR:[H]/IR:[H]/AR:[H]) Environmental 
66.4711161Cost  
5-(CVSS2#AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N) 
E:[ F ]/RL:[ OF ]/RC:[ C ]) Temporal  
(CDP:[ L ]/CR:[L]/IR:[L]/AR:[L]) Environmental 
 6.9811213Cost  
6-(CVSS2#AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C) 
(E:[ P ]/RL:[ OF ]/RC:[ C ]) Temporal  
(CDP:[ H ] /TD:[H]/CR:[H]/IR:[H]/AR:[H]) Environmental 
91.9611890Cost  
We classified the vulnerabilities according to their impact on 
the privilege, the vulnerabilities with impact on confidentiality 
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or integrity or availability, with user privileges we arrange 
them in user privileges row, user privileges. While the 
vulnerabilities that will allow an intruder to immediately gain 
privileged access (root, system administrator). We classified 
them under root privilege as shown in Table 5, as you can 
notice we processed all the vulnerabilities  as operational level 
0 while in operational level 1 we only process the 
vulnerabilities with multi steps intrusion according to the rules 
and regulations mentioned in 2.2 . You can notice in figure 7 
that the user privilege vulnerabilities distribution start from 
less than 10 severity cost up to less than 70, in other hand the 
root privilege vulnerabilities rang in OL0 started from 70 to 
94.3. In OL1 the range for user level starts from 45.08 to 
66.47 and in root level from 89.53 to 94.3. The above analysis 
indicates the correctness of using risk matrix to classify and 
evaluate the risk. 
 Vn1 Vn2 Vn3 Vn4 Vn5 Vn6 OL0  
User privileges 39.6 45.0 66.4 6.9 39.5 20.7 CIP1,1
 
36 
Administrator privilege 89.5 91.9  89.5  94.  67.4   CIP1,2
 
 86.5 
Operational level zero 
 Vn1 Vn2 Vn3 Vn4 Vn5 Vn6 OL0  
User privileges   45.08 66.47    CIP1,1
 
56 
Administrator privilege 89.53 91.96 89.53 94.3   CIP1,2
 
91.33 
Operational level 1 
Table.5: Operational levels of IP1 Host 
 
Figure.7: Vulnerabilities distribution for IP1  
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The list of Vulnerabilities we got after using Nessus scanning 
reports on (IP2): 
 
 
 Vn1 Vn2 Vn3 Vn4 Vn5 Vn6 Vn7 Vn8 Vn9 Vn10 Vn11 OL0  
User 
privileges 45.87 58.94 58.94 59.29 67.52 41.41 35.82 42.62 59.12 38.39 20.19 
CIP2,1
 
48.01 
Administrator 
privilege 
94.87 83.65 74.04 97.64 79.92 70.83     CIP2,2
 
83.49 
Operational level zero 
 Vn1 Vn2 Vn3 Vn4 Vn5 Vn6 Vn7 Vn8 Vn9 Vn10 Vn11 OL0  
User 
privileges 45.87 58.94 58.94 59.29 67.52 41.41 35.82 42.62 59.12 38.39 20.19 
CIP2,1
 
48.01 
Administrator 
privilege 
94.87 83.65 74.04 97.64 79.92 70.83     CIP2,2
 
83.49 
Operational level 1 
Table.6: Operational levels of IP2 Host 
 
 
Figure.8: Vulnerabilities distribution for IP2 
 
In our model, the attributes of hosts IP1, IP2 include: 
1- Attacker‟s access privilege on each host: Privilege level, 
i.e., root or system administrator (2), privileged user (1), user, 
guest, or none (0). 
2- Security Metrics cost for each host: represent the CVSS 
score with the Risk Assessment levels for each host. 
3-Exploit mode: The locality of an attacker performing an 
exploit 
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If you look at figure 9 below, we have five states to represent 
the cost centric attack graph for IP1 and IP2. Notice the direct 
cost to reach s1, s2, s3 represents OL0„s costs, while the 
indirect cost from (s2, s1), (s2, s3), (s2.s4) and (s3,s4), (s3,s1), 
(s3, s2) and (s4,s1) and (s1, s4) represent OL1 „s costs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Att , 2) (IP 1 , 2) (IP 1 , 1) (IP 2, 1) ( IP 2 , 2) 
S0 S1 S2 S3 S4 
 
Figure-9: Cost centric attack graph 
4. CONCLUSION 
The paper describes a new method of representing a unique 
severity cost to the total weight of all vulnerabilities for each 
host, using CVSS scores of base, temporal and environmental 
metrics by combining related sub-scores and modelling the 
problem‟s parameters in to a mathematical framework. 
Generally the quantitative score of the risk in combining of 
exploitability and impact scores. Since 1980 the above 
method has been challenged. Specialists accept the main 
elements in the function but disagree on the production of 
likelihood and impact to calculate the risk, as the risk should 
be evaluated in terms of maximum impact on an adverse 
event, and for this, we use the risk matrix to collaborate the 
risk equations. Using our framework to measure a single 
severity cost for all vulnerabilities in a single host by creating 
four levels of classifications, the first and second levels 
represent the user and root vulnerabilities. We refer to these 
vulnerabilities  to operational levels zero (OL0) and the third 
and fourth levels represent multi-step and single-step 
vulnerabilities and we refer to these to operational level 
one(OL1).  Using our classifications and tables of 
vulnerabilities and figures analysis, we proved that this 
classification really reflects the usefulness of the risk 
matrices. We used the calculated values to build our cost 
centric attack graph. 
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